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WAGES, EMPLOYER  COSTS,  AND 
EMPLOYEE  PERFORMANCE  IN THE FIRM 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper  I use data fros  a survey of  firms  to estimate the  effects 
of a firm's  wage level on several  measures  of  its hiring  costs and the 
characteristics  and  performance  of  its employees.  These measures include the 
previous experience  and  current  tenure of  its employees;  subjective 
productivity scores for these employees;  job  vacancy  rates;  perceived ease of 
hiring qualified workers for the firs;  and hours spent  hiring  and training new 
workers.  In doing  so,  I  distinguish  the case of high wages imposed  on s firm 
by unions from that in which the firm might be  choosing its wage level in 
order to maximize its  profits.  I also provide  some rough measures of  the 
extent to which firms offset  their high wage costs in each case. 
The results  show generslly  positive effects  of  firm wages on employee 
experience and tenure as well as on subjective  productivity  scores.  The 
firm's  wsges generally  have negative effects  on job  vacancy  rates and  positive 
effects on the perceived  ease of  hiring qualified  workers.  Training time is 
slso reduced.  While the magnitude of each individusl  effect  rssy  not aiwsys be 
large or even  significant,  their combined  effects suggest  that firms offset 5 
good desi  of their higher wage costs through improved  productivity  and lower 
hiring and  turnover  costs among  their  employees. 
Harry Hoizer 
Department of Economics 
Michigan State University 
East Lansing,  MI  48824 I.  Introduction 
It has long  been recognized that firms which are forced  to pay above 
market—clearing  wages will  respond by altering  their hiring behavior.  If,  for 
instance,  unions raise the wages of unskilled workers for  a  firm or industry, 
firms should respond  by  substituting  capital for labor and more highly skilled 
workers for  those  less  skilled.1  Thus, we would expect  to find  higher  skill 
levels and  higher productivity  observed among workers  at unionized firms,  in 
order to prevent workers from fully extracting their  monopoly rents.  The 
amount  of  training provided  to these workers  once hired might be affected as 
well.2 
Of course, these  labor  demand—side  explanations often  assume that the 
skills of workers  are  perfectly observable, that workers within skill 
categories are homogenous,  and that supplies of workers  in  each  category  are 
limitless (I.e.,  perfectly  elastic).3  If, however, these conditions  are not 
met, profit—maximizing  firms  might themselves choose  to pay higher  wages even 
in the  absence of unions.  The recently  burgeoning  "Efficiency Wage" 
literature stresses these difficulties  which  firms may have in hiring, 
monitoring,  and/or retaining high  productivity workers.5  ecause of these 
difficulties,  firms might choose to pay higher  wages In order to  raise  the 
quality and/or quantity  of job applicants,  reduce supervision  costs and  reduce 
turnover.  Employer search  and  matching  models  also  suggest that firms might 
choose high  wages  in order  to lower the foregone  profits associated  with 
lengthy job vacancies  and  perhaps  to lower hiring costs as well.6  Finally, 
firms might change the structure and  method  of pay in addition to its average 
level  in order to create  greater incentives for worker  performance.7 
A great deal of  empirical  evidence  has also been produced  on these 
general topics,  but surprisingly  little  considers  the direct effects  of firm— level wages on employee  characteristics  and performance.  For  instance,  the 
effects  of  unions  on worker productivity,  profits,  training  and  turnover have 
received widespread attention, though few studies focus on the  direct effects 
of  wages as  opposed to the institution  of  unionism  on these outcomes.8  More 
generally, wage effects on turnover  and  absenteeism  have been studied.9  But a 
much broader  range of employee coats and  productive  characteristics  or 
outcomes among workers  must be considered in order to correctly  measure the 
firm's  ability to offset  the costs of higher wages.  The magnitudes  of  the 
effects must be considered as well in any reasonable  attempt to gauge the 
overall effects  of  wages on the firm.1° 
In this paper I use data from  a survey  of firms to estimate the effects 
of  a firm's  wages on  its hiring costs and on the characteristics and 
performance of  its workers.  The focus on wages at the level of  the firm (as 
opposed to the industry  or individual  worker)  will distinguish  this work from 
most previous studies  on related issues.  This focus is consistent with the 
evidence of wage differentials  between firms  for comparable workers  of  which 
economists have long been aware (e.g. Dunlop (1957))  but which remain poorly 
understood to date. 
Several  measures of  worker  quality and  performance  are used  as outcomes 
here.  These include:  the previous  experience  of  the worker  and his/her 
tenure with the current employer; as well as subjective  productivity  scores as 
gauged by  the employer.  In addition,  I will consider job vacancy  rates and 
the perceived ease  of hiring qualified  workers  to measure firm  hiring 
difficulties  and how wages affect  them.  Finally,  I will consider  the number 
of  hours spent hiring and training  these new employees  by the employer.  This 
fairly comprehensive  list of responses to firm wages  will  enable us  to 
approximately  measure the degree  to which high wage costs are offset by  firms, 
In a  manner which has not been attempted to date. 
2 In estimating fire—level  wage effects  on these  outcomes,  we will 
distinguish  between  the effects  of unions  on wages,  which are generally 
imposed exogenously  on the firm;11  and other  determinants  of wage levels  which 
might conceivably  reflect firm choices.  These other determinants  will include 
industry and  firm  size,  both of which have clearly  been show  to be associated 
with long—run  wage differences  between firms.12  While this analysis  is  not an 
explicit test  of "Efficiency  Wages"  or any other theory  of wage determination, 
it should shed  some light on the general notion  of whether firms eight ever 
find  it in their  interest to pay high (relative to the  market)  wages. 
The data  which  are  used  here  to  measure  firm effects are  from the 1982 
wave of the  Employment  portunity Pilot Project  (EOPP) Survey of Firms.13 
This  wave of  the survey  was administered  to approximately  31100  firms  in 28 
local areas.  The survey  is discussed in greater detail  below. 
The results of the estimation  can be  briefly summarized  here.  We 
generally find  positive effects  of firm  wages on employee experience  and 
tenure as well  as on  subjective productivity scores.  The  firm's  wages  also 
have negative effects on  job vacancy rates and  positive effects on  the 
perceived  ease of  hiring qualified  workers  as well as negative  effects on 
hours  of training.  While  the magnitude and/or  significance  levels of many of 
the  individual  effects are  not large,  taken  together they suggest that firms 
offset  a  good  deal  of their higher wage costs through improved productivity 
and  lower  hiring  and  turnover  costs  among  their employees. 
The rest  of  the paper  is laid  out as follows:  Section II describes the 
data and  the equations estimated  in greater  detail, while Section III  presents 
the results  of  estimated  equations.  Section  IV presents  a summing  up of the 
various  effects to estimate an overall  effect  of wages on  profits,  while 
Section V contains the conclusion  and implications  of this work. 
3 II.  Data and Equations 
In  order to consider the  effects  of  a firm's  wage level on its cost and 
profits, we must distinguish  between its  effects  on fixed  hiring  costs and  on 
its variable costs and revenues  of operating.  For a given period of time,  a 
firm's  profits  can be written as follows: 
1)  II  = PQ(W,  (1—V)J)—w(1—V)J  — 
FRCH 
where FR  and CR  reflect the frequency  of hiring and direct  cost per  hire 
respectively;  V reflects  the rate at the firm; 
.J  is the number  of jobs 
currently available in the firm;  and  F, Q and W reflect prices,  output and 
wages at the firm.  Both output  and labor costs therefore  depend on non—vacant 
jobs (i.e., employment  in the firm)  as well as on wages in this formulation, 
though  employment above the specified  job level does not add to output or 
revenue here. 
The frequency  of  hiring should  reflect  employee turnover as well as net 
employment growth at the  firm.  The cost per  hire  should reflect both the 
duration and  intensity of hiring  activity, which in turn  should influence the 
number of hours spent by company personnel  in recruiting, screening,  and 
training new employees.  The wages of company personnel  and  other direct 
hiring expenditures (such as  advertising, etc.) are included as well  in this 
term.  Finally, the vacancy rate also depends  on both the frequency  and 
duration  of  new hiring activity,  as well  as the fractions of each in which the 
positions being filled  are actually  vacant. 
The firm's  wage level might raise output levels by inducing  the firm to 
hire more qualified workers.  This should  be  easier  to do if the quantity and/or quality  of job applicants  attracted by the firm  rises  with the wage. 
The wage level might also affect direct  hiring  costs in a variety of ways.  By 
reducing employee turnover  (or,  equivalently,  raising employee  tenure  with the 
firm),  higher wages will reduce  the frequency  with which new employees  must be 
hired.  Costs per hire might also be reduced if a larger and  better applicant 
pool leads to  fewer hours spent recruiting  and training by company 
personnel.  Monetary costs of recruiting  should  be reduced as well.  Finally, 
reductions in the frequency  and duration  of hiring  will also reduce vacancy 
rates and thus the costs of foregone  output associated  with vacant  jobs.  Of 
course,  large offsets  of  wage costs in terms of  training or expected 
productivity should  imply smaller  ones in terms of  vacancy rates and/or 
turnover, as the net attractiveness  of high—wage jobs  for workers becomes 
diminished. 
Assuming that  the price level  and number of  jobs are fixed,  the effects 
of wages on firm profits can be  seen by differentiating  Equation 1) as 
follows: 
2) 
dli  3Q  3Q  v 
dW  — 
3W 
— 
3(1—V)J  3W 
— (1—V)J 
3V  3FH  3CH  + W.J•  — 
•C 
—  F 
where the costs of higher  wages  must  be  balanced  against the potential 
benefits of higher  output, lower vacancies  and  lower direct hiring costs.  If 
the firm is free to choose its wage level, it will  do  so in the  usual manner 
of equating these marginal costs and benefits.  If,  however,  the wage is 
exogenously  determined (by unions  or otherwise),  Equation  2)  simply  enables us 
to measure the degree to which these higher  costs can be offset by the firm. 
5 The data with which we will analyze these  issues  are from  the  EOPP 
Survey of firms  in  1980 and 1982.  This  survey  was administered  in 28 local 
areas that were sites for  the  EOPP  labor market  experiments in the  late 
1970's.  The sites are heavily  concentrated  in the South and mid—West,  and 
about  half are  SMSA's.  Large and/or  low—wage firma  were oversampled  within 
each site. 
The 1982  survey,  which we use  below,  asked  two general types  of 
questions  of  employers:  one type covering firm—wide  characteristics  (e.g., 
number of  employees, fraction  unionized,  number of  vacancies,  perceived  hiring 
difficulties  etc.) and the other covering the last worker hired during the 
previous year.  Mong the  latter  questions in the 1982 Survey were the 
occupation,  sex,  age and  years of education  of  the worker,  as well as his or 
her wages — both  starting  and current (or most recent if  the employee  was no 
longer with  the firm). 
One measure of employee  performance  that is available for these workers 
is a subjective performance  rating.  Employers were asked to score  the most 
recent employee's productivity  on a  scale from 0 to 100, where the former 
would reflect no productivity  and the latter the  maximum feasible  Output  on 
the job.  The question  was asked for different points  in the employee's  tenure 
at the firm:  the first two weeks,  the third through  twelfth weeks,  and 
currently/most recently.  Separate  questions  were asked  for "typical" 
employees on the same job so that relative comparisons  could be  made within 
the firm. 
As for more objective employee  characteristics  which might be 
performance—related,  a few  different  measures of employee experience are 
available in these  data.  One question  asked how many months of  previous 
experience  the employee  had that has some application  to the current job. 
6 Presusably,  this question gauges  occupation and/or  industry—specific 
experience.  From the  question  on the employee's  age and  years of  education, 
we can also calculate  a standard  measure of  total  labor market experience 
(i.e.,  age minus years  of  education minus  6). 
For a  measure of turnover and therefore  of hiring frequency,  tenure 
within  the firm was specifically  asked from those employees  who were no longer 
with the firm.  For those  still present, tenure  can be calculated from  the 
date of hiring and the survey date.  In addition  to the tenure  measures, 
several  questions  were  asked  about  the asount  of time explicitly invested in 
training by the new  employee.  Total  hours of  formal  and  informal  training 
provided  by management,  supervisors,  or trained personnel as well  as time 
spent  with co—workers are available.  The hours spent recruiting  and  screening 
workers for this position are available as  well. 
Using these  data,  we can estimate  the effects  of firm—level  wages on a 
variety of labor outcomes.  We  note that an individual  employee's  wages and 
quality (or  productivity)  can be  decomposed into firm—wide and  individual— 
specific components: 
3)  W1  W 
+ 
I)  Q..  Q.(W.)  + 
where  Wand  Q reflect wages  and  quality respectively  while the subscripts i 
and j denote  the  individual  and  firm  respectively. Thus an  individual's  wage 
is  some  function wj(Qj) of his/her perceived  quality in addition to a firm— 
wide  premiun W, which in turn influences the quality of worker attracted 
and/or retained by the firm.  Other equations  comparable  to 'I)  could  be 
7 specified for  employee  tenure or for time  spent training  the employee.  In 
addition, some firm—wide  outcomes (such as vacancy rates  or ease of  hiring) 
can be  denoted as follows: 
t)  V  V(W.)  + v. 
.3  3  3 
with both wage—determined  and random  components. 
If direct  observations  on the firm  -wage premium  were available, 
these equations  could be estimated recursively.  But given that only 
individual employee's  wages are available  in the data, we estimate  the 
following simultaneous  equations: 
5)  W .  =  a  + b X.. + c  Z  .  +  d  Y. + c 
ij  W  W 13  U ij  W 3  W,13 
6)  X  =  a  + b  14. .  +  c  Z.  + e 
ij  X  X 3.3  X  3.3  X,1,J 
6')  V  =a +bW.+cZ.+e 
j  V  V ij  V lj  V,ij 
where the  are the  observed individual  characteristics  or outcomes 
described above,  (such  as  experience and productivity  ratings),  the Z1 are 
exogenous worker and job characteristics,  and the  are exogenous 
characteristics  of the uirm.l!! 
The Z1j variables used here include sex, occupation and education (i.e. 
high school  or college) dummies.  The Y  Include  2—digit industry  dummies as 
well as fraction  unionized and  a group of firm size variables.  The latter 
include a continuous  measure of firm size  within  the site as well as  a set of 
dummies for total  firm  size  (i.e.,  0—99,  1OO—249,  250—'99,  500—1999, 2000+). 
The crucial  assumption of this model  is that the  can be excluded 
from and  thereby  used  to  Identify  equations 6)  and  6').  This is tantamount to 
8 assuming that  these  variables affect  the various labor outcomes strictly 
through the wage and  not directly.  This assumption is no doubt questionable, 
especially for industry (where  technological  differences  independent  of the 
wage may determine  differences in hiring).  Even  firm size might directly 
affect the quality  of job applicants independently  of  the wage.15 
Furthermore,  the exogeneity of industry  and  size with respect to the 
wage as well as the observed outcomes  might also be in doubt,  as wage 
differentials with regards to each might reflect maximizing  behavior and 
therefore self—selection.  Indeed,  the "Efficiency  Wage" theories  noted above 
predict such self—selection,  which may cause biases (though  mostly towards 
zero)  in estimated wage effects.16 
For those reasons,  we estimate different specifications  of Equations 6) 
and 6').  In some,  the fraction  unionized and/or  plant and  firm size will be 
used to identify  the  outcome  equations; while in others, industry  dummies will 
be  used as well.  In all  cases,  statistical  tests will be  discussed for the 
validity of  the  exclusions  used. 
An additional  concern in some cases below involves  the subjective 
nature of  certain  outcome variables  — i.e., the productivity  ratings  and 
perceived ease  of hiring.  The former,  in particular,  are known to contain a 
good deal of  measurement  error (Bishop,  1987)  and may also  contain firm  — 
specific  components  that are  correlated with our instruments for firm—level 
wages, thereby causing  biased  estimates.17  Of course, the  additional  use of 
objective outcomes (i.e.,  experience/tenure instead of productivity scores  and 
vacancy  rates instead  of ease of hiring) provides a  check on  any  results 
obtained with the subjective  outcomes.  Furthermore,  evidence  will be provided 
below on the relationships  between experience,  productivity  scores,  and  wages 
that will underscore  the validity of  both.  In partaicular,  we will note that 
9 fixed—effects  estimates of these relationships  are  fairly  comparable  to cross— 
sectional  ones, thereby  suggesting that biases from  firm—specific  effects  are 
not severe. 
We note a few  other econometric  issues  before  moving  on to the 
results.  We estimate the various  outcome equations  independently  of  one 
another,  thus abstracting from cross—equation  effects and error 
correlations.18  Thus,  the outcome equations are  of  a reduced—form  nature. 
A few other aspects  of  the estimation  below are noted mm well.  For one 
thing, certain  limited dependent variable  functions  will be estimated  where 
appropriate,  using predicted firm wages as the independent  variable.19 
Finally, continuous  hazard models of  the Weibull form  will be estimated in 
order to gauge the  effect of  the  firm's  wages on tenure  outcomes. 
Ill.  Empirical Results 
In Table 1 we find  means and  standard  deviations  of  several key 
variables for  the sample  used here.  Two types of variables  are considered: 
those which reflect the  characteristics  and  performance  of the last  worker 
hired as well as those of  the firm itself. 
Several characteristics  of  workers and firma in the sample  are 
noteworthy.  The starting  wages are relatively  low,  reflecting  a sample  which 
is predominantly  comprised of high school  workers  in clerical, males,  and 
service  jobs.  It is also a fairly  young sample,  averaging  8—9 total years of 
experience in the labor market.  Average tenure  on the job is just under 1 
year.  These characteristics  of  workers  reflect  the fact that low—wage firma 
were overaaapled  and also  that the last—hired workerm  will over—represent 
high—turnover,  low—wage jobs and low—tenure workers  within firms. 
10 Table 1 
Means (and  Standard  Deviations)  of  Key Variables 
Last Worker Hired:  Firm: 
Starting Wage  $5.02  Fraction Unionized  .113 
(1.88)  (.288) 
Education:  Local Firm Size  68.185 
High School  .782  (227.933) 
College  .087  Vacancy Rate  .018 
Occupation:  (.059) 
Professional/Technical  .O'2  Perceived Ease  of  Hiring 
Managerial  .01O  Qualified  Workers: 
Clerical  .15H  Very Easy  .315 
Sales  .190  Not Very Difficult  .267 
Crafts  .005  Somewhat Difficult  .2'48 
Operatives  .020  Very Difficult  .170 
Laborer  .002 
Service  .192 
Missing  .355 
Prior Experience  (Years): 
General  8.581 
(8.925) 





Hours of Training: 
Formal  8.991 
(3  8.779) 
Informal  5.118 
(Management)  (73.716) 
Informal  38.768 
(Co—workers)  (129.283) 
Hours spent Hiring: 
Total  12.225 
(2  8.865) 
Per Applicant  2.155 
(I.6I7) 
Productivity  Score  80.057 
(17.598) The vast majority of training hours reported here  are for  informal 
training  by  both co—workers and management.  Flours spent hiring by management 
are lower  than those  spent training.  Current  or most recent productivity 
scores  average about 80, which is significantly  higher  than those attributed 
to workers at the time  of hiring. 
P.s  for the firms  themselves,  we find  that they are relatively large but 
less unionized relative to random  national samples.20  Vacancy  rates are 
fairly  low, and a majority of firms do  not report  difficulties  in hiring 
qualified  workers. 
Fixed Costs:  Hiring Time,  Training Time 
In Tables 2  and 3 we  present  estimates of the effects of the firm's 
wage levels on  its hours spent hiring and  training  respectively.  These 
estimates are from versions  of  Equation 6)  above  in which hours spent hiring 
or training are the dependent varlablea.  A similar  set of  equations are 
estimated for other outcomes and  reported  below. 
The equations reported here  and below  are  estimated  using two—stage 
least squares.  Several specifications  are  presented  In  which  industry, 
fraction unionized  and  firm size variables  are  used  to identify the two  stages 
and  provide estimates of the firm wage.  To test whether high  wages  caused  by 
unions  have different effects from  those chosen  by  the firm,  we present 
separate estimates of the union wage effect (column  3) and  the size—wage 
premium  effect (Column  H).  Coefficients  on  these variables  when they appear 
as controls are presented as well.  We  use the  individuafs  starting  wage to 
calculate this premium,  and we  control for a variety  of personal 
characteristics (i.e.,  education,  sex,  occupation,  site,  and  year hired) in 
the outcome equation.21 
11 Table 2 
Firm Wage Effects  on Hours Spent  Hiring — 2SLS 
A.  Total Hours Spent Hiring 
I 
Firm  Wage  13.14314  21.970  6.9140  1'43.204 
(5.361)  (114.911)  (13.906)  (75.099) 
Fraction Unionized  ———  ———  ——— 
(.205) 
Local Firm Size  3.4 
(.8111) 
Firm Size  no  no  yes  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
.055  .087  .103  .0314 
13. 
Hours Spent Hiring  per Applicant 
I  I 
Firm  Wage  .1044  —1.095  —.965  31459 
(.859)  (1.919)  (2.2112)  (7.142k) 
Fraction Unionized  ———  ———  ———  .007 
(.020) 
Local Firm Size  .0141 
(.131) 
Total Firm Size  no  no  yes  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
.069  .099  .101  .092 
NOTE:  Education,  sex, occupation,  site,  and year dummies  are included in 
these  and. all subsequent equations.  Sample size for this and all 
subsequent tables  is 1278.  Industry  dummies are 2—digit  unless 
otherwise indicated.  Hours spent hiring include  hours spent 
recruiting,  screening  and interviewing  job applicants.  Standard 
errors  are presented in parentheses  in this and all other tables 
below. Table 3 
Firm Wage Effects  on hours Spent Training  — 2SLS 
A.  Formal  Training  by Management 
Firm Wage  —13.085 
(13.759) 
Fraction  Unionized 
Local Firm Size 
Total Firm Size  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no 
82 
a  a 
Firm Wage  —'15.258 
(24.384) 
Fraction Unionized 
Local Firm Size 
Total Firm Size  no 
Dummies 
Industry  Dummies  no 
82  .035  .068 
—13.877  82)412 











—10.  87  8 
(15.  993) 
Firm Wage 
Fraction Unionized 
Local Firm Size 
Total Firm Size 
Dummies 
Industry  Dummies 
82 
—12.  701 
(18.  738) 
.458 
(1.096) 
no  no  yes 
no  yes  yes 
.088 
Informal  Training 
.035  .089 
by  Management 
2.239 








—28.982  —158.590 





yes  no 
yes  yes 
.087  .066 
by Co—Workers 
3  4 
2 




.049  .084 
Informal  Trainine 
a 
—26.412 
(53.  911) 
no 
yem  yes 
.005 Table 2 contains results for  hours spent hiring.  Because high—wage and 
large firms receive  more job  applicants  which, in turn,  should  require  more 
time spent  screening and interviewing  applicants,  we present  estimates of 
equations for  total hours  spent as well as  hours  spent per  applicant.22 
The results show that high—wage firms generally must spend  more total 
time on their hiring activities  than do other firms.  Only when a strict  union 
wage premium is considered (i.e.,  when we  control for  industry and  firm size) 
does this result  not appear.  However,  hours spent per applicant show no such 
effect.  If anything, these effects are generally  negative (though  not 
significant). Thus,  the larger  quantity (and  perhaps  quality) of  job 
applicants received by high—wage firms  requires  them to spend more time on 
screening, though  some small  economies  of  scale  may emerge.23 
The effects  of  firm wages on hours spent training new employees appear 
in Table 3.  Separate  equations appear  for the three types of  training 
considered:  formal, informal  provided by management,  and  informal provided  by 
co—workers. 
The results show generally  negative effects  of  firm wages on  all  three 
types of  training,  though  most effects  are not  significant.  Only the effects 
on hours  of informal training  provided by  management are marginally 
significant  when we control for  industry  but not  firm size.2  We also note 
that the  results  here conflict somewhat  with those presented by Barron et.  al. 
using the same data.25 
Comparing  Tables 2 and 3, we find  that the magnitudes of  the combined 
negative training  effects are generally  larger  than the positive  effects  on 
total time spent hiring.  While the costs associated  with the different kinds 
of time presumably  differ,  the results  suggest  that total time spent and costs 
per new employee  might be lower in high wage firms. 
12 Hiring Frequency:  Tenure 
Of' course, the question remains  as to  how frequently  these  new 
employees must be hired,  which depends  on  turnover.  Previous  research (cited 
above) has shown  lower turnover among high—wage employees and  industries  as 
well as unionized firms.  In Table  14  we consider  whether this holds more 
generally for employees  of  high—wage firms.  The table presents  estimates  of 
hazard functions in which the dependent variable is months of  job  tenure. 
Estimates are presented using  the Weibull functional  form. 
The results show that higher firm wages generally lead to higher  tenure 
with the firm.26  The effect of  high wages in large firms  is particularly 
strong,  while that in union firms is negative but not significant.27 
Overall, then,  we find  that high wages in a firm generally  enable it to 
reduce  turnover and thus the number of  new employees it must hire,  as well as 
the total time associated  with each  new employee.  Fixed hiring costs thus 
appear to be lower in high—wage firms. 
Vacancies and Ease of  Hiring 
As noted above,  a firm's  output  and labor costs reflect  its vacancies 
as well as its direct  wage costs,  and vacancy rates can give us some 
indication about  the frequency and duration of hiring activities.  In Table 5 
we present estimates  of  vacancy  rate equations.  Given the large fraction  of 
firms (i.e.,  about  85%)  which report no vacancies,  we  estimate those equations 
using  Tobit as well  as OLS.  In  both  cases, the  firm—level  wage is the 
predicted wage based on virtually the  same  instruments as  were  used  in the 
previous tables,28  Control variables are comparable as well. 
13 Table 4 
Firm Wage Effect on  Months of  Job  Tenure  — 
Weibull  Hazard  Functions 
.1  1  .1 
Firm Wage  .0118  .180  —.048  .540 
(.050)  (.085)  (.103)  (.192) 
Fraction Unionized  ———  ———  ———  —.0013 
(.0006) 
Local Firm  Size  .033 
(.008) 
Firm Size  no  no  yes  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
Log  L  —17'I.68  —146.78  —154.30  —164.21 Table 5 
Firm Wage Effects on Job Vacancy  Rates 
A.  2SLS 
I  I 
Firm Wage  —.020  —.056  —.014  —.069 
(.011)  (.019)  (.023)  (.038) 
Fraction Unionized  ———  ———  ———  .0001 
(.0001) 
Local Firm Size  —.006 
(.002) 
Total Firm Size  no  yes  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
R2  .052  .059  .072  .059 
B.  Tobit 
I  a 
Firm  Wage  —.023  —.028  —.158  .388 
(.048)  (.084)  (.104)  (.165) 
Fraction Unionized  ———  ———  ——  —.0017 
(.0006) 
Local Firm Size  .014 
(.007) 
Total Firm Size  no  no  yes  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
Log L  —547.7  —253.9  —250.3  —249.2 
NOTE:  In these equations, firm wage is a predicted variable  based on the 
regressors used in all  of the previous tables.  Industry  dummies 
are 1—digit  here. The results  show that higher wages are usually associated  with lower 
vacancy rates,  though  once again the exact  magnitudes are difficult to pin 
down.  Comparing Tobit estimates to those from OLS equations we find 
coefficient  magnitudes among the former  which are much more unstable,  varying 
in both sign  and  magnitude.  We  also find  standard  errors which are always 
larger among the former.  The largest and most significant  negative effect is 
the one associated  with union wages in the  Tobit equations,  while the Tobit 
effect of  large firm size has the opposite sign. 
An alternative  method of testing for  hiring  effects  of  wages can be 
found by  analyzing  the firm's  perceived ease of  hiring qualified  workers.  As 
noted above,  this subjective variable  may refer  to any or all components  of 
hiring costs  and may  also reflect  firm—specific factors  that could  cause 
biases  if correlated with regressors.  Still, it provides  us with  an 
additional measure  of  hiring costs with which to the estimate the effects  of a 
firm's wages. 
Equations for the  effects of wages  on  perceived  ease  of hiring  appear 
in  Table  6.  In these  equations, the dependent variable  takes  on  a  value of 
one if firms  report  that  the hiring of qualified  werkers  is  "very easy"  or 
"not  very difficult"  and zero  if such hiring is "somewhat  difficult" or every 
difficult".  Other specifications  not reported  here provided relatively 
similar  estImates. 29  Equations are estimated  using two—stage  least squares. 
The results  of  Table 6 show that higher  wages  generally  cause  the 
perceived  ease  of  hiring  qualified workers  to rise as well.  Only the union 
wage effect is not significant  here,  while the  wage effect  associated with 
firm  size is quite large. 
Overall, then,  we find  firm wage levels  to be  negatively  associated 
with hiring costs and  difficulties.  Though  hours spent recruiting and 
vI Table  6 
Firm  Wage Effects  On Ease of Hiring 
—  2SLS 
.186  2.687 





yes  no 
yes  yes 
.135  .0110 
NOTE:  Dependent  variable is equal to one if employer  finds it very 
easy on not very difficult to hire qualified  workers and zero 
otherwise. 
Firm  Wage  .468 
(.093) 
Fraction Unionized 
Local Firm Size 
Total Firm Size  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no 





.116 Table 7 
Firm Wage Effects On Years of Prior  Experience 
A.  General Experience 
—  2SLS  I 
Firm Wage  14.713  2.627  4.1468  7.572 
(1.630)  (3.621)  (4.199)  (114.912) 
Fraction  Unionized  ———  ———  ———  .029 
(.0141) 
Plant Size  ———  _——  —.012 
(.2145) 
Firm Size Dummies  no  yes  yes  no 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
R2  .0148  .082  .087  .068 
B.  Related  Experience  — 2SLS 
I  I 
Firm Wage  3.024  1.837  1.912  14.172 
(.775)  (1.739)  (2.032)  (6.297) 
Fraction Unionized  ———  ———  ———  —.007 
(.017) 
Plant Size  ———  ———  .017 
(.119) 
Firm Size  Dummies  no  no  yes  no 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
.079  .108  .110  .113 
C.  Related Experience  — Tobit 
I  I 
Firm  Wage  14.1430  1.795  1.139  2.521 
(1.?53)  (2.007)  (2.392)  (14.o9) 
Fraction  Unionized  ———  ———  ——  —.003 
(.0114) 
Plant  Size  ———  .1142 
(.171) 
Firm  Size  Dummies  no  no  yes  no 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
Log L  —2907.1  —2902.1  —2901.1  —2902.1 
NOTE:  The tobit equations use 1—digit  industry  dummies  rather than  2—digit 
for computational  reasons. Table 8 
Firm Wage Effects  On Current  Productivity  Scores  — 2SLS 
I 
Firm  Wage  7.053  16.056  15.'187  16.773 
(3.308)  (7.1161)  (8.719)  (27.788) 
Fraction Unionized  ———  ———  ———  —.002 
(.076) 
Local Firm Size  ———  .270 
(.570) 
Total Firm Size  no  no  yes  no 
Dummies 
Industry Dummies  no  yes  yes  yes 
p2  .01111  .076  .077  .075 screening rise  for high wage firms,  hours Spent  training  per new 
fall by even larger  amounts.  The frequency  of  new hiring  apparently. 
reduced and  employee  tenure  rises while the costs associated  with vacant 
are probably reduced  as well. 
Employee tharacteristica and  Performance 
For  employees of relatively long  tenure,  the variable costs of higher 
wages  per hour or week of work will likely swamp  any  reductions in  fixed 
hiring costs which they  might cause.  These  variable  costs must therefore be 
compared to improvements  in the characteristtc  and/or  performance of 
employees  hired in these firms. 
Without direct  evidence on worker  output, we use two  different proxies 
for the performance  of workers in the firm.  One is the number of years of 
prior experience  which the employee  has had,  either  general  or related to the 
(described  above)  job at the firm.  The other is  the productivity  score 
assigned to the worker either  currently or at the end of  his/her tenure with 
the firm.  The experience  measures have the advantage  of  being objective, t5 
avoiding the problems associated  with subjective  variables.  1owever,  there 
may be some doubt as to whether prior experience  is truly productivity— 
enhancing  30 
In order to consider more carefully the  nature of  these proxies for 
worker productivity,  the Appendix  contains estimates  of OLS equations for 
wages and productivity  scores of  workers.  The wage equations correspond to 
Equation  5)  above.  They appear with and without  the productivity  score 
included as an additional  independent  variable. 
These equations show that both experience  and  productivity scores are 
positively associated  with individuals  wages.  Related  experience has effects 
15 which are several  times larger than those of general experience.  Furthermore, 
the effects  of productivity  scores  on wages seem to be largely (though  not 
totally) explained  by prior  experience.  The productivity  score equations also 
show particularly  large effects  of related experience. 
Furthermore,  a variety  of wage—change  and productivity—change  equations 
presented in Hoizer (1988)  show results  which are fairly  comparable  to those 
presented in the Appendix.31  Since these change equations  omit fixed  effects 
of  firms in the  performance  ratings (which  should  capture some of the 
subjective differencess  across  managers of different firms in how they rate 
employees),  we may conclude that both prior experience  measures as well as 
subjective productivity  scores  are reasonable proxies for worker  performance 
at the firm. 
In Tables  7 and 8 we move  on  to consider the effects  of firm—level 
wages on our  various proxies for worker  preference.  Table 7 contains 
equations for years  of prior experience  while Table 8 contains the  firm 
productivity scores. 
Table 7 provides separate  estimates for general and related 
experience.  Because  of  the large fraction (i.e.,  about  110%)  of workers  with 
no related  experience  reported,  we  provide Tobit estimates  as well  for this 
latter  measure.32  The results  show generally positive effects  of firm  wages 
on  years of  prior experience.  However,  these estimates are generally  not 
significant  once we have controlled for industry.  Furthermore,  it generally 
appears as though industry  effects  exist independently  of  firm wages 
(according to F—tests on  the  industry  dummies). 
The  results of productivity score  equations in Table 8 provide strong 
support for the  notion that worker  productivity rises with the firm wage 
level.  Effects  of wages  are positive and  significant in all  cases except  for 
16 Table 9 
Summary  of Firm Wage 
Effects  on Hiring Costs and 
Employee  Performance 
Industry, 
Union,  Size  Union, Size  Union  Size 
Effects  Effects  Effect  Effect 
Outcomes: 
Hours Spent Hiring 
Total  ++  +++ 
Per  Applicant  +  — 
Hours  Spent Training 
Formal  —  + 
Informal:  Management 
Informal:  Coworkers  ———  —  + 
Months of  Tenure  +  +++  +4+ 
Job Vacancy Rates  — 
Ease of Hiring  +4+  + 
Prior Experience 
General  +4+  +  +  + 
Related  +  +  + 
Productivity Scores  + 
NOTE:  Three plus or minus signs reflect  statistical  significance  at the 10% level 
(2—tailed  test); two reflect  it at the  20% level,  and one reflects  the higher 
levels.  The four columns  here correspond to columns 1—il In Tables  2 through 
8.  Job vacancy rate and experience  level estimates  reflect  2SLS with linear 
(rather  than Tobit)  second stage here. the  firm—size—wage effect.  In contrast,  coefficients  on the  control variables 
for unionism and  local firm size  show little  direct  effects  of  these factors, 
Before moving on,  we present  a summary  of all of these estimated 
effects  of  firm wages on hiring  costs and employee  characteristics  or 
performance  in Table  9.  For  each outcome  variable in Tables 2 through 8,  we 
present  the sign (i.e.,  plus or minus)  of  the wage effect under  each of  the 
four different exclusion restrictions. Results  which are significant  at the 
20% level in  a 2—tailed test are represented  hy 2 signs,  which significance  at 
or better  than 10% is represented  by three signs. 
The table shows that the firm's  wage level generally  has positive  and 
negative effects respectively  on total hours spent hiring  and  training  new 
workers.  Effects on  vacancy rates are  also generally negative while those on 
employee  tenure,  perceived ease  of hiring,  experience and  perceived 
productivity are positive.  The vacancy,  ease of hiring,  and productivity 
scare effects are significant  in three of  the  four  specifications  presented 
and  the tenure effect  is significant  in two of  the four.  In general, the wage 
premia  associated with firm size  are  more likely  to be significant  than are 
those associated with unicnism.  This is true despite  the fact that selection 
biases are more likely  to bias estimated coefficients  towards zero  for the 
former. 
IV.  A Summing  Up  of  Wage Effects 
Given the variety of firm wage effects  which we have estimated for 
hiring and  training,  vacancy rates,  and worker  quality/performance,  we now 
must sum up these magnitudes  to determine the  extent  to which wage costs can 
be  offset for high—wage firms.  While this effort  requires some fairly  heroic 
assumptions  and therefore  must be  viewed  as being only suggestive,  it does 
17 shed light  on the relative  magnitudes of the estimated effects  and therefore 
on how these effects net out  for firma. 
To do  this computation,  we consider Equation (2) from  page 5 above, 
which decomposes  wage effects on  profits into  components based on output 
(directly and  through vacancy rates),  wage costs, and fixed  hiring  costs.  In 
order to  make  Equation  (2) tractable for this effort,  we  must  transform it 
into  the  following: 
dm1!  dlnPQ  dlnWC  dlnHC 
dlnW 
- 
dlnW  w dlnW  H dlnW 
where the revenue (PQ)  and wage cost (WC)  elasticities  include  the direct 
effects of wages (first  and third  terms  of Equation  2) respectively)  as well 
as their indirect effects  through  the vacancy rate (second  and  fourth  terms of 
Equation 2) respectively).  The hiring cost (HC) elasticity includes  wage 
effects on both frequency  and coat per hire (fifth  and sixth terns of Equation 
2)), while the  l's represent the shares  of revenue accounted for by  direct 
wage costs and  hiring  costs respectively. 
We  obtain Equation (7) by dividing  Equation (2)  by PQJ/W.  The 
estimated effect of  wages on profits  can then be calculated from our estimated 
means and  coefficients  in previous  tables.33  To perform  the calculation,  we 
make the assumption that labor accounts  for about 70% of  the total value of 
output and  that 10% of  this goes to specifically  personnel—related  activity, 
so we can approximate  1  and 1H with the fractions  .6 and .1  respectively. 
In order to  obtain estimates  of  the elasticity  of  revenue  with respect 
to wages, we also make the following  assumptions:  1)  proportional  changes in 
performance  ratings equal proportional  changes  in output per rker and 
therefore  in revenue (since  we are  treating  prices  as constant); and  2) the 
18 Table  10 
Effects of a  10%  Wage 
Increase on Profita 
Industry,  Union 
Union,  Size  Size  Union  Size 
Effects  Effect  Effeot  Effect 
1.  Output Effect 
Direct Wage Effect  .0088  .0201  .0193  .0210 
Vacancy Effect  .0020  .0056  .00114  .0069 
Total  .0108  .0257  .0207  .0279 
2.  Labor Coat  Effect 
Direct Effect  —.0982  —.0982  —.0982  —.0982 
Vacancy  Effect  .0020  .0056  .00114  .0069 
Total  —.0962  —.0926  —.0968  —.0913 
Weighted by Share  —.0577  —.0556  —.0581  —.0548 
3.  Hiring Cost  Effect 
Cost per Hire  Effect  .0295  .0582  .0606  —.0332 
Weighted  by Share  .0030  .0058  .0061  —.0033 
Frequency Effect  .00148  .0180  .00148  .0540 
Weighted by Share  .0005  .0018  —.0005  .0054 
4.  TOTAL EFFECT  —.0318  —.0223  —.0248  —.0434 
NOTE:  These four columns  correspond directly  to colums 1—k in Tablea 2 through 8. 
Job vacancy  rate estimates reflect  2SLS  with linear (rather  than Tobit) second stage 
here. effect or a percentage point change in the vacancy rate (and therefore of 
occupied jobs)  on output is 1% — i.e., constant returns to scale. 
As for  the  elasticity  of  profit  with respect to hiring  costs, we  aasume 
that the hiring frequency  is the inverse  of expected job tenure and  then use 
our estimated wage effects on duration (Table  4) to calculate the  effects  of 
wages on this rrequency.4  We use hours spent recruiting and training each 
each new employee as a  measure of the cost per hire.35  But since an hour 
spent by  co—workers is presumably  not as costly to the firm as an hour spent 
by  management personnel, we value each of  the latter at twice the value of 
each of  the rormer.6 We also adjust  time spent in formal  training to account 
for the  fact that each hour of  management time usually accommodates  multiple 
employees.37  The elasticity  of total hiring coats is then obtained by 
aggregating  these  effects  and dividing  by appropriately  weighted  means. 
In Table 10 we present  calculations  of  how a 10% rise in the firm's 
wages will effect  profits.  We present  separate estimates  based on  wage 
effects  from each of the  four  specifications  used  in Tables  2  through  8. 
Table  10  also  presents estimates of each of the  three terms of Equation  (7), 
which are appropriately weighted  and  summed  to produce estimates of total 
effects as well. 
The results show that a 10%  rise  in wages will lower  profits  by  2.2%  to 
4.3%.  More specifically,  the increase  caused by unions  will lower profits  by 
3.3% while such a wage increase  associated  with firm size reduce profits  by 
about  2.5%.  Comparing  the total  reduction  in profits to that which would be 
caused  without any adjustment  by the firm, these results  suggest that about 
46% of the higher wage costs associated  with unions and about 58% of  that 
associated with firm size is offset by  firms. 
19 The results  are, of course,  driven primarily  by the relatively  large 
weight  attached to the revenue effect  and to the magnitude  of  the  wage effect 
on  revenue (output)  which ia comparable between the  union  and  firm  aize 
casem.  While the crucial aamumption  that observed wage effects on performance 
rating effectm equal  those on output is indeed  questionable,  we also  note  that 
the estimated magnitudes of the offset are consistent  with various  estimates 
of  the fraction  of the union wage differential  that is accounted for by 
personal  characteristics  (e.g.,  Mincer (1983),  Freeman (1984)).  The evidence 
of lower profits  in the union sector  despite  higher experience  and/or 
productivity  (Becker and Olson (1987))  is also consistent with the finding 
here of  a partial  wage offset for unionized firms.  Finally,  we  note once 
again that  problems such as self—selection  noted above are likely, if 
anything, to bias these results  in downward direction. 
V.  Conclusion 
In  this paper I provide estimates  of how the wage level of  a firm 
affects  its hiring  and training  costs as well as the observed characteristics 
and performance  of  its  employees.  This is done using  data from  a  nationwide 
survey of  firms on the number of  hours spent hiring and  training  their most 
recent employee;  the characteristics  (i.e.,  experience and job  tenure)  and 
performance  (subjective  ratings)  of  that employee; and vacancy  rates as well 
as other measures  of  hiring difficulties.  Separate  estimates are provided for 
union wage  premia  as opposed to those associated with firm size  and/or 
industry. 
The results generally  show that high—wage firms have lower hiring and 
training  costs as well as better  employee performance.  More  specifically,  we 
find fewer  hours spent on informal  training,  longer tenure  with the firm,  more 
20 years of previous job experience,  higher performance  ratings,  lower vacancy 
rates,  and  higher  perceived ease in hiring for  higher  wage firms.  However, 
the exact magnitudes  and  significance  levels (as  well  as the signs  in a few 
cases)  are quite sensitive to whether identification  is achieved  through 
fraction  unionized  or employee  size. 
Furthermore,  we make some attempt  to crudely  measure the overall costs 
and  benefits to the firm of these higher wages.  These calculations  are quite 
incomplete  and  require some heroic assumptions  to which the  results  are quite 
sensitive.  Nevertheless,  the calculations suggest  that about 6% of  the 
higher wage premia  unions  and about 58% of  those  for of large firms are offset 
by reduced costs and  improved  performance. 
Future research on these wage effects require  better  measures of 
outcomes,  especially  those measuring worker  Output  and performance.  Financial 
data on the profits and  capital  values of firms might be preferable.  More 
careful specifications of how  various outcomes are  related  to each  other and 
to wage measures would  also be  useful. 
21 FOOT  NOTES 
1References  to employer  substitution in response to union wages date 
back as far  as Lewis (1963)  and  were also  stressed  by Johnson(1975). 
Oiscussions  of union effects  on productivity  and  profits  appear in Slichter 
at.  al.  (1960),  though they focus on  institutional  factors  rather  than direct 
wage effects.  It should  be  noted that the predicted effects  of  union wages 
within  a labor demand framework  contrast  with those of the "efficient 
contracts"  approach,  which stresses union control over employment  as well as 
wages (Farber,  1986).  Union effects  may also be present for non—union rkers 
due to "insider" power  (Lindbeck  and Snower, 1986)  or the threat of 
unionization (Dickens,  1985). 
2The effects  of unions on  hours  of' training are theoretically 
ambiguous.  If  unions  have a  larger effect on  starting  wages than on 
subsequent ones, we might expect  unions to reduce  on—the—job training  in the 
same manner as the minimum wage appears to  do (Haahimoto,  1981).  But if 
unions raise wages independently  of (or more than proportionately  with)  job 
tenure,  it may pay for firms to invest  more training in the new Mres.  On the 
other hand, employee incentives  to invest in such  training may be reduced 
(Mincer,  1983).  The specificity  of the training involved  and the expected 
tenure of  the employee  should  also affect  the firm's  training  choices. 
3simple  labor—demand models of wage—taking  firms assume infinitely 
elastic supplies of labor in each category  of workers.  If,  instead,  firms 
face upward—sloping  labor Supply  curves (especially  in the short—run),  the 
market—clearing wage would  clearly  rise as well.  Firms might still prefer  to 
pay  an  above—market  wage to generate a  queue  of highly skilled  workers from 
which  to choose. 
22 4lhis  possibility  has, of course,  long been recognized  in the 
personnel/human  resources literature.  See,  for  example,  Milkovich and  Newman 
(1987). 
5The different  versions of efficiency wage theory  are summarized  in 
Yellen (19814)  and  Katz (1987). 
6Employer search  models include Barron  et.  al.  (1985),  Jackman et.  al. 
(1985),  and Albrecht  and Axell (1985).  These models frequently  posit that 
employees  choose wages and/or search  intensities  to maximize profits  which, in 
turn, depend on  efficient  matching of  jobs and workers.  Models in which wages 
depend on bargaining solutions  once a  match has occurred  include  Pissarides 
(1985)  and  Davidson  et. al.  (1987).  Evidence  on employer  search  intensity 
also appears in Barron  et.  al. 
7See Brown  (1988)  and Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987)  for discussions  of 
these issues. 
8Union effects  on productivity  are reviewed  in Addison and Hirsch 
(1986)  while those on firm profits  are discussed in Becker  and  Olson (1987). 
For union effects  on turnover see Mincer (1983)  and Freeman  and Medoff 
(1984).  The turnover studies generally sort out wage  and union effects.  An 
alternative approach  to this issue is to use  panel data in determining  the 
extent  to which the cross—sectional  union wage effect  is an actual wage 
premium as opposed  to a return for higher quality  workers.  Mincer (1983)  and 
Freeman (1984)  conclude  that half or more of  the observed  effect is  a union 
premium. 
9See Pencavel  (1970),  Viscusi (1980)  and  Allen  (1981)  for evidence on 
turnover and absenteeimn  effects  of wages. 
23 10For  recent papers  which  consider  the effects of wages  on  several 
employee outcomes and then  compare  potential  benefits with the costs of higher 
wages  see Raft'  and  Summers (1987)  or Leonard (1987).  The former  considers 
data on the Ford  Motor  Company  before and  after the introduction  of the "Five— 
Dollar Day" in  19iI.  The latter analyzes  effects  of  wages on supervisory 
personnel and  turnover  in six  occupations for a sample of  high—technology 
firms. 
11This assumes, of course, that estimated union  wage effects are not 
fully explained  by  differential  union organizing  success among highly—skilled 
workers. 
12lndustry  wage effects (and their relative  constancy over time)  are 
described in Krueger  and  Summers (1987)  and Dickens  and Katz (1986).  Intra— 
industry  wage differences  are also considered  in Groshen (1985).  Evidence of 
firm size effects  on wages is provided in Mellow (1980)  and  Brown and  Medoff 
(1987) as well. 
13The  1982 wave of  the EOPP Survey  was designed at the National Center 
for Research on Vocational  Education (Ohio State University)  and  administered 
by  Gallup, Inc. 
would be  possible to  use individual instead of firm—level wages  in 
Equations  U).  However,  we continue to use firm—level  wages, as the focus of 
this steady is on wage differentials  at that level.  The firm—wide  wages also 
lessen the problem  of unobserved heterogeneity  which would plague  wages at the 
individual  level. 
15Evidence  presented in Hoizer  et.  al.  (1988)  shows  that firm  size 
affects the quantity  of  job applicants  received per opening by firms 
independently  of wages  paid.  Assuming that the quantity and  quality  of  the 
best applicants are positively  correlated,  firm size might have independent 
effects on  the quality  of hires as well. 
2R 161f  for instance,  all firms  need  workers of a c 
level and  all choose the wages needed to attain  such uorker 
no relationship  between wage levels  and  performance.  Only to 
firms vary in their need for  high  performance  (because  output and 
more dependent on such performance  for  some  than  for others)  will  th 
effect be observed. 
17Purely  random measurement  error in the dependent variable  would 
result in  inefficiency  but  no  biases.  Fixed  effects can cause biases  in 
either direction, depending on the correlation of  these effects  with the 
relevant independent  variables. 
8Seemingly  Unrelated Regression  estimates  might have been appropriate 
here, but the identical  specifications  of right—hand  side variables  eliminated 
this possibility. 
19lobjt  models will be used for vacancy  rates,  since most firms  (about 
80%)  report no vacancies.  They will also  he used for  applicable  experience, 
where about l0%  of the sample  reports  move.  The use of predicted  wage 
variables in these equations is an approximation to  a fuller  treatment  of 
simultaneity  in limited dependent  variable  models. 
20Average private sector  unionimn  in the Unite States in 1982 was 
approximately 18%. 
21We use starting  wages rather  than current/most  recent  wages for 
calculation of the firm  wage premia because the latter is strongly affected  by 
job tenure,  which is an outcome  variable in this study.  However, the 
correlation here between starting  and current wages Is about  .9,  and estimated 
results using both variables are  quite  similar. 
22See Footnote 15. 
23These results  are generally  consistent with those of  Barron,  Bishop 
and Ounkelberg (1985). 
25 2Industry  controls appear  to affect  training independently  of  the 
wage, as F—statistics  on these dummies are  highly  significant  in all of  the 
training equations. 
25arron  et.  al use log—odds  specifications  for the probabilities  of 
workers  receiving each type of  training.  Using  continuous as opposed to 
discrete training  variables, as well as the use of  firm—level  rather  than 
individual  wages,  appear to cause the conflicting  results. 
26lndustry  dummies are again significant  in these outcome equations. 
is important to remember  while interpreting  the coefficient  on 
unions that this is a partial  effect,  controlling  for the effects of firm 
wages which, in turn,  already  capture  industry,  size and  union effects. 
28For computational  reasons,  we use 1—digit  rather than  2—digit 
industry  dummies  here.  All  other  instrtsnents and controls are comparable. 
29For instance,  defining the dependent variable  as one if hiring is 
very easy and zero otherwise produces  quite comparable results. 
30See,  for instance,  Medoff and Abraham (1981)  for evidence  that tenure 
with the firm may not enhance  worker  productivity. 
those equations,  I  interpret  employee  tenure at the firm  as the 
change in total experience  for that worker.  Experience effects  on 
productivity  scores  and on wages as  well as productivity  scores  effects on 
wages continue  to  be positive  and significant  in those equations, with most 
magnitudes remaining quite comparable  to those  of cross—section  estimates, 
32As in the case of  vacancy  rate equations, the predicted wage variable 
is based on the same set of  instruments  as in all  other equations  except for 
the use of 1—digit  dummies.  Controls  are comparable as well. 
26 33We  divide  by J for this and  all  other terms of  the  equation  since our 
estimated  effects apply only to the last worker hired.  The estimated  effect 
of loW on performance  ratings is then divided by mean performance  and added  to 
the vacancy  rate effect of  lnW to obtain  the elasticity  estimate.  We use the 
OLS rather than  tobit estimates  of vacancy effects,  since  the  former  are more 
stable  and plausible in magnitude. 
3If FH 
= l/T then  dLnFH/d&nW  —dLnT/d&nW,  which is simply  the 
additive inverse  of any of  the Weibull hazard  function  coefficients  presented 
in Table 
35We  thus  abstract from direct  monetary costs of recruiting. 
36Mean weekly  wages in May,  1978  for managers was $322 compared to  231, 
175,  and 152  for sales, clericals,  and service  workers respectively  who are 
paid  weekly.  Hourly  rates are '4.66,  2.93,  3.72,  and 2.93 respectively.  (BLS 
Bulletin 2096,  September 1982).  The two—to—one  ratio of  managerial  to non— 
managerial wages is thus a  reasonable approximation  here. 
37See Bishop (1988),  who assumes  an average  class—size  of  two at formal 
training sessions. 
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30 Appendix 
Experience,  Productivity  Scores,  and Wages of  Individuals 
Wage  Levels 
2  3 
.0112 
(.0026) 
——  —.0003 
(.0001) 
——  .0393 
(.00'lS) 
——  —.0009 
(.0002) 
.0019  .0009 
(.0004)(,0003) 
.423  .514 
Productivity  Score Levels 
.1604 
(.2181) 







NOTE:  In addition  to the variables  listed,  the wage equations 
contain the following  controls:  sex,  education,  occupation, 
year,  and site dummies,  as well as hours of  training.  All 
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